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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
The district court erred in denying Mr. Bonilla’s motion to suppress and abused
its discretion at sentencing. The district court denied Mr. Bonilla’s motion to suppress
because it concluded Mr. Bonilla consented to a frisk for weapons and the officer who
conducted the frisk did not exceed the scope of his consent, or of a permissible frisk
under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), when he lifted up Mr. Bonilla’s t-shirt without
first conducting a pat down of his clothing. The State contends the district court did not
err in its ruling and also argues the evidence found in Mr. Bonilla’s vehicle should not
have been suppressed because it was supported by independent probable cause based
on a drug dog’s alert on Mr. Bonilla’s vehicle. The State did not meet its burden of
proving in the district court the applicability of the automobile exception to the warrant
requirement and the record is not sufficient for this Court to apply this exception in the
first instance. This Court should reverse the district court’s order denying Mr. Bonilla’s
motion to suppress. Alternatively, this Court should conclude the district court abused
its discretion at sentencing.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Bonilla included a statement of facts and course of proceedings in his
opening brief. (App. Br., pp.1-5.). He relies on and incorporates that statement herein.
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ISSUES
1.

Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Bonilla’s motion to suppress?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it sentenced Mr. Bonilla to a
unified term of ten years, with two years fixed, for possession with intent to
deliver, and for five years, with two years fixed, for unlawful possession of a
firearm, to be served concurrently?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Bonilla’s Motion To Suppress
A.

Officer Reimers Exceeded The Scope Of Mr. Bonilla’s Consent, And Exceeded
The Scope Of A Terry Frisk, When He Lifted Up Mr. Bonilla’s T-Shirt Without
First Conducting A Pat Down Of His Clothing
Mr. Bonilla argued in his opening brief that Officer Reimers exceeded the scope

of his consent, and the scope of a permissible frisk under Terry, when he lifted up
Mr. Bonilla’s t-shirt without first conducting a pat down of his clothing. (App. Br., pp.811.) The State argues the frisk was permissible because the officer’s act of lifting up
Mr. Bonilla’s t-shirt was a reasonable way to search for weapons under the
circumstances. (Resp. Br., pp.10-15.) The State’s argument is based on an incorrect
interpretation of Terry and its progeny and must be rejected. Where, as here, a search
is based on consent, “the State must conform its search to the limitations placed upon
the right granted by the consent.” State v. Tyler, 153 Idaho 623, 626 (Ct. App. 2012).
Officer Reimers did not conform his search to the limitations placed upon it, which was a
Terry frisk, and the search thus violated Mr. Bonilla’s rights under the Fourth
Amendment.
In Terry, the United States Supreme Court defined a frisk as “a carefully limited
search of the outer clothing.” 392 U.S. at 30. Our courts have “repeatedly reiterated
that under Terry, a protective frisk is generally limited to a pat-down of the outer
clothing.”

Tyler, 153 Idaho at 627.

The State argues in its brief that any limited

intrusion designed to discover guns, knives, clubs or other instruments of assault is
permissible under Terry. (Resp. Br., p.13.) The Court of Appeals rejected this exact

3

same argument in Tyler. See Tyler, 153 Idaho at 628 (rejecting the State’s argument
that “the standard under Terry is merely whether the search was confined in scope to an
intrusion reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden
instruments for the assault of the police officer”) (quotation marks omitted). The Court
of Appeals explained in Tyler that this standard failed to “take into consideration the
privacy interests of the person being searched” and “would provide virtually no limit to
the scope of a frisk for weapons.” Id.
In Tyler, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s grant of the defendant’s
motion to suppress, recognizing “the officer did not first attempt a pat-down of [the
defendant’s] outer clothing . . . which may have provided the basis for an additional
intrusion depending on what the officer felt.” Id. at 628-29. This is consistent with case
law from other jurisdictions holding “[a]n actual search of a person’s body is not
authorized under Terry until after a pat down confirms the presence of a weapon or
contraband.” United States v. Aquino, 674 F.3d 918, 925 (8th Cir. 2012) (discussing
cases from the Second, Fourth and Eighth Circuits). Here, the State did not meet its
burden of demonstrating the particular factual circumstances justified any intrusion
beyond a pat-down of Mr. Bonilla’s clothing, which Officer Reimers never conducted.
This was the basis for the district court’s order denying Mr. Bonilla’s motion to suppress,
see R., pp.100-09, and that order must be reversed.
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B.

The State Did Not Meet Its Burden Of Proving In The District Court The
Applicability Of The Automobile Exception To The Warrant Requirement And The
Record Is Not Sufficient For This Court To Apply This Exception In The First
Instance
Mr. Bonilla argued in his opening brief that all of the evidence discovered

subsequent to Officer Reimers’ discovery of marijuana in his pocket during the so-called
frisk stemmed from the frisk and should have been suppressed. (App. Br., p.12.) The
State argues in its brief that even if the frisk was unlawful, the evidence discovered in
Mr. Bonilla’s vehicle should not have been suppressed because the search of the
vehicle was supported by independent probable cause—specifically, the drug dog’s
alert on Mr. Bonilla’s vehicle—and the search thus fell within the automobile exception
to the warrant requirement. (Resp. Br., pp.5-11.)
Mr. Bonilla anticipated the State would make this argument and thus, in his
opening brief, argued the drug dog’s alert did not provide an independent basis for the
discovery of the evidence found in Mr. Bonilla’s vehicle because, first, the State did not
meet its burden of demonstrating the seizure of Mr. Bonilla was sufficiently limited in
scope and duration; and, second, the drug dog’s entry into Mr. Bonilla’s vehicle was
facilitated by law enforcement and was not instinctual. (App. Br., pp.12-14.) In order to
satisfy the requirements of the Fourth Amendment, the State has the burden of proving
a warrantless search falls within one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement.
State v. Bottelson, 102 Idaho 90, 92 (1981). The State did not meet its burden of
proving the search of Mr. Bonilla’s vehicle was supported by independent probable
cause based on the drug dog’s alert.
The district court did not make any findings or conclusions regarding whether the
traffic citation would have been issued to Mr. Bonilla, and the purpose of the stop
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completed, prior to the deployment of the drug dog and absent the unlawful frisk.
Without such findings or conclusions, this Court should not decide in the first instance
that the traffic stop would not have been extended absent the illegal frisk.
The district court also did not make any findings or conclusions regarding the
circumstances surrounding the dog’s entry into the open door of Mr. Bonilla’s vehicle.
The State asserts in its brief that Mr. Bonilla “apparently failed to shut the vehicle’s door”
but the State did not present any evidence in the district court to support this claim.
Officer Reimers testified at the preliminary hearing that he deployed his drug dog
around Mr. Bonilla’s vehicle after he placed him under arrest, beginning at the front
license plate and proceeding counterclockwise, and the dog jumped into the vehicle
through the open driver’s side, and alerted after jumping in the vehicle. (6/17/15 Tr.,
p.10, Ls.6-14.) The State did not present any evidence regarding the reason the door
was open, including whether the dog was leashed at the time it was deployed, which
would be critical in determining whether the dog’s entry into the vehicle was instinctual
or facilitated.

Compare State v. Naranjo, 159 Idaho 258, 259-61 (Ct. App. 2015)

(concluding dog’s entry into vehicle was instinctual, not facilitated, where defendant “left
his driver’s side window open” and the dog “spontaneously moved his head up to the
open window” when the officer directed the dog to sniff at the door’s seam) with United
States v. Winningham, 140 F.3d 1328, 1331 (10th Cir. 1998) (concluding dog’s entry
into vehicle was facilitated search where police opened van door, unleashed dog as he
neared the door, and dog entered the van).
This Court is not in a position to make factual findings on whether the stop would
have been extended absent the illegal frisk and whether the dog’s entry into
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Mr. Bonilla’s vehicle was facilitated or instinctual. If the State wanted to rely on the
automobile exception to the warrant requirement, it was the State’s responsibility to
introduce sufficient evidence in the district court to support this exception. The State did
not do so.

The district court denied Mr. Bonilla’s motion to suppress because it

concluded Mr. Bonilla consented to a frisk for weapons, and the search conducted by
Officer Reimers did not exceed the scope of a Terry frisk. (10/8/15 Tr., p.18, Ls.11-21;
R., pp.100-09.)

As discussed above, the district court erred as a matter of law in

concluding Officer Reimers did not exceed the scope of Mr. Bonilla’s consent and of a
permissible Terry frisk when he lifted Mr. Bonilla’s t-shirt without first patting down his
clothing.
II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Sentenced Mr. Bonilla To A Unified
Term Of Ten Years, With Two Years Fixed, For Possession With Intent To Deliver, And
For Five Years, With Two Years Fixed, For Unlawful Possession Of A Firearm, To Be
Served Concurrently
On this issue, Mr. Bonilla relies on the argument contained in his opening brief.
(See App. Br., pp.14-17.)
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, as well as those set forth in his opening brief,
Mr. Bonilla respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction, reverse the district
court’s order denying his motion to suppress, and remand this case to the district court
for further proceedings. Alternatively, if this Court finds no error in the district court’s
order denying his motion to suppress, Mr. Bonilla respectfully requests that this Court
reduce his sentences as it deems appropriate or vacate his sentences and remand this
case to the district court for resentencing.
DATED this 14th day of November, 2016.

___________/s/______________
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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